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Summary As healthcare institutions are a focus of smallpox transmission early in an epidemic,
several mathematical models support pre-event smallpox vaccination of healthcare workers
(HCWs). The deciding factor for HCW voluntary vaccination is the risk of disease exposure versus
the risk of vaccine adverse events. In a United States military population, with careful screening to
exclude atopic dermatitis/eczema and immunosuppression, over 1 million vaccinia (smallpox)
vaccinations were delivered with one fatality attributed to vaccination. Among 37 901 United
States civilian volunteer HCWs vaccinated, 100 serious adverse events were reported including 10
ischemic cardiac episodes and six myocardial infarctions — two were fatal. This older population
had a higher rate of adverse events due to age-related coronary artery disease. T-cell mediated
inflammatory processes induced by live vaccinia vaccination may have a role in the observed acute
coronary artery events. With exclusion of individuals at risk for coronary artery disease, atopic
dermatitis/eczema, and immunosuppression, HCWs can be smallpox vaccinated with minimal risk.
A carefully screened multidisciplinary cadre (physician, nurse, infection control practitioner,
technician), pre-event vaccinated for smallpox, will supply the necessary leadership to alleviate
fear and uncertainty while limiting spread and initial mortality of smallpox.
# 2007 International Society for Infectious Diseases. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.Introduction
Several mathematical models of smallpox (variola virus) out-
breaks have been proposed.1—6 All have appropriate informa-
tion to offer public health response planners, although their
conclusions vary due to differing assumptions and statistical* Tel.: +1 509 376 9635; fax: +1 509 376 9023.
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1201-9712/$32.00 # 2007 International Society for Infectious Diseases.
doi:10.1016/j.ijid.2006.11.005methods. Themodels attempt tominimize outbreakmorbidity
and mortality through various vaccination policies and proce-
dures. Smallpox vaccination complication rates with the cur-
rently available live vaccinia virus are of significant concern to
individuals and public health response planners. More recent
information on vaccination complication rates, especially for
healthcare workers (HCWs), is now available from the experi-
ence of vaccinia virus vaccination in the USA over the last five
years. Combining the more recent knowledge on vaccination
complications and potential immunologic mechanisms withPublished by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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HCWs opportunities for themost informed decisions. Nomodel
can be truly predictive, no one control measure identified as
best, but evidence exists for the prevaccination of HCWs prior
to the first recognized case.
The article by Longini et al., Containing a large bioter-
rorist smallpox attack: a computer simulation approach, is a
discrete time, stochastic computer simulation model that
offers additional planning guidance for a smallpox outbreak.1
Although interpretation of the model’s information may
differ, the article concludes ‘‘Given that surveillance and
containment measures are in place, preemptive vaccination
of hospital workers would further reduce the number of
smallpox cases and deaths, but would require large numbers
of prevaccinations’’ for the greatest effectiveness. In their
computer simulation, the hospital had 686 workers (a rela-
tively small facility compared to many tertiary care institu-
tions) and 133 of these made close contact with smallpox
cases prior to the initiation of isolation measures. Of 828
cases, 50% originated in the hospital and 13% of the contacts
were untraceable. Preemptive smallpox (vaccinia virus) vac-
cination of 10% of the hospital workers, in addition to sur-
veillance and containment, had a small effect on the average
number of cases; however, preemptive vaccination of 50% of
the hospital workers had a relatively large effect on case
reduction. The larger number of preemptive vaccinations
required less contact tracing and ‘ring’ containment vacci-
nations. A delay of one day in fully implementing surveillance
and containment resulted in a large epidemic.
Ferguson’s 2003 synopsis stated ‘‘historically, most infec-
tions occurred in caregivers to symptomatic individuals,
whether in households or hospitals,’’ and Bozzette’s 2003
findings conclude ‘‘the analysis favors the prior vaccination of
healthcare workers. . .but would cause 25 deaths nation-
ally.’’5,6 A death rate less than one per million (nine deaths:
six primary and three revaccinees) was reported in 1968, the
last year for mass smallpox vaccination in the USA.7 With
continued attention to the pre-event smallpox exclusionary
criteria of atopic dermatitis/eczema and immunosuppres-
sion, and additional exclusion of those with significant cor-
onary artery disease risk factors, an even lower fatality rate
may be possible based upon review of the United States
smallpox vaccination experience from the past five years.
Vaccinia vaccine complications–—United
States recent experience
Vaccinia (smallpox) vaccine can be safely delivered to a
carefully screened population. As of April 28, 2006, the
United States Department of Defense (DoD) has administered
over 1 004 000 DryvaxTM (Wyeth; New York City Board of
Health strain vaccinia) live virus vaccinations to military
operational forces and HCWs. Most adverse events were at
rates below historical values, and the death rate directly
attributed to vaccination was one per million in this select
population of male and female military members.8 Other
vaccinia strains, such as the Lister strain utilized in some
European countries, may have higher estimated complication
rates (8.4 deaths per million vaccinations).9 Of the initial
screened military population, ninety thousand members
were medically exempt, a majority for a history of atopic
dermatitis/eczema or family member with the condition.The one unfortunate attributable death was a 22-year-old
female United States Army Reservist undergoing mobiliza-
tion. A lupus-like syndrome developed a month after receiv-
ing five vaccinations including smallpox and anthrax. The
evidence favored a causal relationship to the vaccinia vacci-
nation. Pathology showed a lymphocytic pericarditis with
eosinophils and diffuse alveolar damage.10 As of October
2004, 24 DoD vaccinees were hospitalized with myocardial
ischemia 2—24 days post vaccination. Myocardial infarction
occurred in 13 military members, with one fatality. Many
individuals presenting with cardiac ischemia had significant
preexisting cardiovascular disease.11 The coronary events
were judged unrelated to smallpox vaccination. An expert
panel also concluded that the ischemic events did not exceed
the expected level of 40 cardiac admissions in unvaccinated
DoD personnel. The authors of the myocardial ischemia
review, which included the senior leadership of the DoD
smallpox vaccination effort, concluded that the available
data ‘‘do not support a causal relation between ischemic
cardiac events and receipt of the smallpox vaccine; however
this possibility cannot be excluded.’’
In addition, the 114myopericarditis cases (1.14/10 000) in
over 1 million vaccinated were an unexpected complication.
All cases resolved to the best of available knowledge.
Detailed follow-up was possible in 64 patients; all had normal
electrocardiograms (EKGs), echocardiograms, and treadmill
stress tests.12,13 The incidence (1/10 000) of vaccinia myo-
carditis in Finnish conscripts during the late 1970s was simi-
lar.14 An additional Finnish study showed asymptomatic EKG
changes suggestive of inflammatory myocarditis in eight of
234 (3%) conscripts receiving multiple vaccinations including
the live vaccinia virus. Those with EKG changes more often
had a history of atopy.15 Myopericarditis should be considered
in the differential diagnosis of chest pain for those 4—30 days
post smallpox vaccination.
In the DoD population of one million vaccinees, ‘‘There
were no cases of live vaccinia virus transmission in the
workplace; most importantly, among 27 700 healthcare
workers, there were no cases of provider to patient transmis-
sion.’’8 Contact transmission did occur in 55 cases, principally
at home among spouses and intimate partners with no known
serious consequences, including resolution of a vaccinia
keratitis case. Due to an effective education and deferral
program for those with a history of atopic dermatitis/eczema
or immunosuppression, there were no cases of eczema vac-
cinatum or progressive vaccinia. A detailed description of the
first 450 293 vaccinations (70.5% primary and 29.5% revacci-
nations) in the initial five months of the program which
commenced on December 13, 2002, has been published.16
The National Smallpox Preparedness Program sponsored
by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
through the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC) primarily ran January through October 2003 and was
targeted to civilian HCWs and public health response teams.
During this time period, 37 901 civilian volunteers received
vaccinia DryvaxTM vaccination and 100 suffered serious
adverse events.17 In this significantly different population
from military members, 64% of the vaccinees were women.
More than 75% of the vaccinees were between 40 and 64 years
of age and had previously received vaccinia vaccination. The
serious events included 21 cases of myopericarditis and 10
cardiac ischemic events. The 10 ischemic events included
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with two fatalities among women, ages 55 and 57 years old,
one and four days after vaccination, respectively. The inter-
val between vaccination and cardiac symptoms was seven to
14 days with a median of eight days in the majority of cases.
Two cases of insidious onset dilated cardiomyopathy occurred
two to threemonths after vaccination. Statistically speaking,
the rate of ischemic cardiac events in civilian vaccinees did
not appear to exceed the rate in a comparable unvaccinated
population. The older revaccinees had a higher risk of
adverse events due to age-related underlying chronic dis-
ease, especially coronary artery disease. Among the nearly
38 000 live virus vaccine recipients, there was no transmis-
sion of vaccinia to others; specifically, no nosocomial trans-
missions occurred.
After the Health Alert Notice of March 26, 2003, deferring
vaccination for those at risk for coronary artery disease, no
further ischemic cardiac events were reported. Cardiac
deferral criteria included the following: a history of cardiac
disease, or three of the five major risk factors for athero-
sclerotic heart disease (hypertension, diabetes, hypercho-
lesterolemia, smoking, or history of heart disease in a first
degree relative less than 50 years old).17 Publication of the
cardiac deaths associated with vaccination resulted in a rapid
decline in volunteers. As of October 31, 2005, the total
number of HCWs vaccinated according to the CDC is
39 608.18 The rates of expected, preventable, noncardiac
adverse events in the civilian vaccinees were similar to the
military program.
Reported neurological events were generally mild and
self-limited in a combined analysis of the vaccine adverse
event reporting system among approximately 665 000 per-
sons vaccinated against smallpox by the DoD (590 400) and
HHS (64 600) during 2002 to 2004.19 Serious neurological
events included the following cases: suspected meningitis
(13), suspected encephalitis or myelitis (3), Bells palsy (11),
seizures (9), and Guillain—Barre syndrome (3). Of the 39
events, 27 (69%) occurred in primary vaccinees usually within
12 days of vaccination. No neurological syndrome was iden-
tified above baseline estimates. The data indicate that mild
neurologic adverse events may be temporally but not neces-
sarily causally associated with smallpox vaccination.
Vaccinia virus immunology and adverse
events
The 10 cardiac ischemic events with two fatalities within a
14-day post vaccination period among nearly 38 000 civilian
HCWs may have a causal relationship to vaccination. A
vaccinia virus-induced inflammatory response may have a
role in acute coronary events following smallpox vaccination.
Supporting evidence for generalized inflammation post vac-
cination includes vigorous cytotoxic T-cell and interferon-
gamma (IFN-g) responses after the appearance of inoculated
vaccinia skin vesicles.20 In 107 naı¨ve volunteers receiving the
Aventis-Pasteur vaccinia formulation, levels of INF-g, inter-
leukin (IL)-10 and tumor necrosis factor-alpha (TNF-a) were
significantly elevated with dramatic increases in INF-g at one
week in nearly 50% of cases.21
A vulnerable atheromatous plaque contains T-lympho-
cytes, macrophage foam cells, and ‘activated’ intimalsmooth muscle cells. In patients with fatal myocardial infarc-
tion, the acute plaque rupture site is marked by a coordi-
nated ‘cross talk’ inflammatory response of these cells. T-
lymphocytes activate themacrophages, and T- cell activation
is likely an important mechanism in the pathophysiology of
the acute coronary syndrome (ACS). Unstable plaques show a
tenfold increase in T-cell content by PCR indicating specific
antigen driven recruitment of T-cells in unstable lesions.
Marked INF-g upregulation can be observed in unstable pla-
ques and the consequent Th1 response (INF-g, TNF) may have
a critical role in the outcome of the lesions.22
Fracture of the atheromatous plaque’s fibrous cap is best
understood as a mechanism for an acute coronary event.
Inflammation causes various forms of plaque disruption
including endothelial cell death due to cytolytic attack by
activated killer T-cells. Most of the tensile strength of the
fibrous cap is conferred by interstitial collagen molecules.
Collagen production by smooth muscle cells can be inhibited
by proinflammatory cytokines such as INF-g.23
The above immunological data support a possible mechan-
istic link between smallpox vaccination and acute myocardial
infarction in high-risk ACS individuals several days after
smallpox vaccination; further study in this area is warranted.
Smallpox vaccination deferral in individuals with multiple
risk factors for atherosclerotic coronary artery disease is
certainly a prudent policy. Older essential HCW personnel
with cardiac risk factors desiring smallpox vaccination may
consider a cardiac exercise stress test to detect high-grade
atherosclerotic coronary plaques.
Vaccinia pericarditis is not related to fixed obstructive
coronary artery lesions and may be immunologically
mediated or the result of a direct cytotoxic effect of the
vaccinia virus. The possible increased incidence of vaccinia
pericarditis with an atopic history noted by the Finns in the
1970s may hold a clue to the pathogenesis.14
The immunology of vaccinia virus in the dermis offers
insight into the adverse reactions in individuals with atopic
dermatitis and the complication of eczema vaccinatum.
The live virus inoculation method by scarification (multiple
superficial punctures to the skin with a bifurcated needle)
induces a diffuse dermal immunologic response. Langerhans
cells, at the base of the epidermis, are implicated as
antigen processing sites, and replication of the vaccinia
virus in the lower epidermis is important to developing
effective immunity. The skin of atopic individuals involves
multiple abnormal immunologic responses including
increased expression of Th2 cytokines such as IL-4.24 Atopic
individuals also have keratinocytes producing abnormal
chemokines favoring Th2 lymphocyte production of IL-4,
IL-10, and IL-13. Higher levels of IL-4 inhibit production of
INF-g; lower levels of INF- g contribute to the overgrowth of
the vaccinia virus.
Decreased cytotoxic T-cell generation is also noted in
atopes. IL-4 has been shown to downregulate antiviral cyto-
kine expression and cytotoxic T-cell responses to vaccinia
virus. In addition, overexpression of the Th2 cytokines in
atopic dermatitis resulted in decreased human cathelicidin
LL-37, an antimicrobial peptide that kills the vaccinia virus.25
As atopic dermatitis and eczema are increasing in frequency
in the population, further investigation into the T-cell immu-
nology of the vaccinia virus will benefit the increasing num-
bers of at-risk patients.
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healthcare worker multidisciplinary cadre
In 2002, attitudinal research on HCWs showed that the
relative weight of the risk of disease exposure versus the
risk of vaccine adverse events is the deciding factor for
voluntary smallpox vaccination.26 Four variables were sig-
nificant in favor of vaccination: perceived risk of smallpox
attack, self-assessed knowledge of smallpox vaccination,
previous smallpox vaccination status, and male gender.
In addition, HCWs well informed on smallpox vaccination
should know that the vaccination is required within three
days of exposure to prevent disease. Successful ‘ring vacci-
nation’ (isolation of symptomatic patients and vaccination of
all contacts which includes HCWs) requires rapid diagnosis.
Time to diagnosis is an essential parameter in determining
intervention strategies.27 Unfortunately, survey data in 2003
revealed poor smallpox diagnostic skill among primary care
and emergency room physicians in a large urban academic
medical center. Only 36% correctly answered three of four
differential diagnosis questions and only 17% reported com-
fort in diagnosing smallpox.28 In the age of globalization with
rapid air and ground personal travel, a few individuals can
spread smallpox infection over large areas, especially during
their contagious 24 hour prodromal period prior to the initial
outbreak of vesicles. In the recent mumps virus outbreak in
the central United States (Iowa), 11 persons possibly infected
with mumps traveled by aircraft on 33 commercial flights
operated by eight different airlines, potentially exposing 575
persons.29 Two cases of infection may have been transmitted
in flight.
A multidisciplinary cadre team (physician, nurse, infec-
tion control practitioner, technician) will safely be able to
evaluate and care for suspected initial smallpox patients,
along with being called upon to quickly initiate vaccinia
vaccinations for their healthcare facility. Today’s HCWs,
although well-meaning professionals, are still human beings
vulnerable to self-preservation, with concerns of risks to
spouses and children, or threats to their economic livelihood.
A survey of nearly 6500 HCWs in New York City showed that
they were most willing (80%) to report to work during a
snowstorm and least willing during a severe acute respiratory
syndrome (SARS) outbreak (48%). Willingness to report in a
smallpox outbreak was 61%. Ability to report for a mass
casualty event was 81%; ability to report for a smallpox
outbreak was one of the lowest at 67%.30 The human factor
of fear when facing a fatal contagious disease is difficult to
model mathematically.
A smallpox prevaccinated multidisciplinary cadre, known
and trusted by the institutional staff, will supply the invalu-
able leadership that a smallpox crisis will demand tomaintain
an effective healthcare facility and minimize the mortality
rate.
United States ‘lessons learned’ on the
preemptive civilian smallpox vaccination
program
The USA can share ‘lessons learned’ regarding poor partici-
pation in the smallpox vaccination program for civilian HCWs.
When implementing an emergency response plan with somedegree of inherent individual risk for a low likelihood high
consequence event, the scientific evidence and analysis must
also include a balance of information available to the public
involving national security.31 A unifying theme of trust is
required for effective communication and information shar-
ing between intelligence agencies, public health organiza-
tions, and citizens of the country. Commitment and attitude
of the implementation staff is also critical to success.
Specific missteps in the HHS initiated program included
rapid implementation without a compensation plan for the
inadvertently injured, lack of effective data systems for
recording vaccine utilization and adverse events, and no
evidence for imminent smallpox attack.31 Poor risk commu-
nication, unfavorable media perceptions, and differing
recommendations by the Advisory Committee on Immuniza-
tion Practices (ACIP) resulted in conflicting messages. Volun-
teers rapidly declined after the March 2003 Health Alert
Notice deferring vaccination for those with cardiac risk
factors. A more successful preemptive smallpox vaccination
program should be possible.
Preemptive vaccination of HCWs against smallpox is a risk
versus benefit decision. This low probability high conse-
quence event weighs the risk/benefits of HCW pre-event
vaccination versus the consequences of morbidity and mor-
tality for providers and patients with increased dissemination
in an outbreak. Healthcare providers and public health plan-
ners now have recent data on the adverse events from over 1
million vaccinia vaccinated individuals, including nearly
28 000 military and 38 000 civilian HCWs. Continued careful
screening and exclusion for atopic dermatitis/eczema,
immunosuppression, and coronary artery disease will mini-
mize the risk of pre-event smallpox vaccination adverse
events for HCWs. Mathematical models are invaluable plan-
ning tools, but do not replace our human cognitive abilities to
assess risk and evaluate our local healthcare institutions and
health departments. Local preparedness is the most impor-
tant factor for an effective response in a healthcare crisis. A
small multidisciplinary cadre of carefully screened and pre-
emptively smallpox-vaccinated HCWs in each institution and
public health district, knowledgeable and confident with
smallpox vaccination, may limit the spread and initial mor-
tality of smallpox.
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